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Abstract. Distributed Denial of Service attacks
(DDoS) have been used by attackers for over two
decades because of their effectiveness. This type of the
cyber-attack is one of the most destructive attacks in
the Internet. In recent years, the intensity of DDoS
attacks has been rapidly increasing and the attackers
combine more often different techniques of DDoS to by-
pass the protection. Therefore, the main goal of our re-
search is to propose a DDoS solution that allows to in-
crease the filtering capacity linearly and allows to pro-
tect against the combination of attacks. The main idea
is to develop the DDoS defense system in the form of
a portable software image that can be installed on the
reserve hardware capacities. During a DDoS attack,
these servers will be used as filters of this DDoS at-
tack. Our solution is suitable for data centers and elim-
inates some lacks of commercial solutions. The system
employs modular DDoS filters in the form of special
grids containing specific protocol parameters and con-
ditions.
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1. Introduction
Nowadays, the risk of cyber-attacks that are aimed at
government, companies, news media or end users rep-
resents a real threat. According to the studies realized
annually, the most commonly used techniques of cyber-
attacks are DoS (Denial of Service) and SQL (Struc-
tured Query Language) injection (It is a statistic of
actually realized attacks). DoS attacks can be simply
divided into two basic types [1]: Flooding attacks and
Logical attacks. In Flooding DoS attacks, an attacker
sends a large amount of traffic to consume CPU (Cen-
tral Processing Unit) or the bandwidth of the victim.
The DoS attack consumes the resources of the victim’s
server or network in order to degrade a performance
or cause a server crash. Flooding attacks take advan-
tage of the weaknesses of the communication protocols
such as TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) [2], [3],
UDP (User Datagram Protocol) [4], [5], ICMP (Inter-
net Control Message Protocol)[6], FTP (File Transfer
Protocol) [2], SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) [7] or
HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) [8]. Logical at-
tacks use weaknesses in applications or software used
at the victim’s side. The attacker sends only a few
messages that abuse the weaknesses of the software in
order to disable or crash the target machine. The DoS
attack is usually performed by a network node (e.g. a
personal computer) seized by the attacker [1]. These
network nodes are called zombies or botnets and they
are not completely under the control of the attacker.
It causes that the attack consists of large quantities of
requests (usually hundreds or thousands), what can be
realized from all over the world. The attacker creates
a necessary infrastructure of botnets simply by using
Trojan horses or other malware, that are running on
the infected network nodes. Distributed Denial of Ser-
vice attacks are performed by multiple nodes. Cur-
rently, the infrastructure of botnets is getting bigger
and ready to attack anytime. More details about DDoS
attacks can be found in survey papers [9], [10].
In practice, DDoS attacks have different use cases
and targets. We summarize these observations in the
following points:
• Denial of Service - it represents a classic usage
of DDoS attacks. The competing companies are
usually the target in this use case and the attacker
wants to cause large financial losses and impair the
company’s reputation. Government networks and
media servers are another typical target of these
attacks.
• Masking of cyber-attacks - in this case, the at-
tacker uses a DDoS attack to mask the “true” at-
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tack that focuses on obtaining specific sensitive
information (e.g. the attacker knows a bug in the
system and he intends to take advantage of that).
Under normal circumstances, the attack realized
would be easily detectable but within the massive
DDoS attack, it is extremely difficult to identify
this attack. Hence, the attacker has enough time
to take advantage of the bug. It usually takes
several days to go through all logs to disclose the
hidden attack. The target of these attacks can be
almost anyone (companies, government networks,
media servers, the banking sector and end users).
• Extortion - in this case, the victim must pay the
attacker certain amount of money under the threat
of DDoS attack.
1.1. State of the Art
From the available security reports that analyze the
network traffic, one can obtain more detailed informa-
tion about DDoS attacks that have been realized within
a certain time period. Important information are the
distribution of individual attacks, duration, intensity
and target of attack [11], [12], [13], [14]. Based on this
information, we can conclude the following facts:
• The distribution of DDoS attack types changes
really quickly in response to the protection im-
plemented. For example, SynFlood was the most
widely used attack earlier but nowadays it is re-
placed by DNSFlood because a lot of users have
already implemented SynFlood protection.
• Security reports confirmed the balance of DDoS
attacks targeted at applications and network in-
frastructure.
• Attackers use increasingly more sophisticated
DDoS attacks that combine different techniques
of DDoS. One example is a large UDPFlood com-
bined with a slow HTTPFlood [15].
• Intensity of DDoS attacks is rapidly increasing
[16], [17]. For example, the average intensity of
one DDoS attack was 3.92 Gbps in the first quad-
rant of 2014, in the second quadrant, the average
intensity was 12.42 Gbps. Hence, we can suppose
the permanent increase of the attack intensity.
One can cast doubts on the detachment of informa-
tion provided because these reports are made by pro-
ducers of DDoS protection. However, we can confirm
the same facts from information provided by data ser-
vice providers from the Czech Republic (Providers of
data services are victims of DDoS attacks, therefore,
providing correct data is in their own interest). In the
Czech Republic, the DDoS attacks demonstrated their
effectiveness in 2013. The media servers (iDNES.cz,
IHNED.cz, Lidovky.cz, Seznam.cz etc.), servers of mo-
bile operators (T-Mobile, Telefonica O2 etc.) and bank
servers (CSOB, Komercni banka, Ceska sporitelna etc.)
were targets of the attacks successively. During these
attacks, end users could not send and receive electronic
mails, make payments in Internet banking and pay-
ment terminals did not work. The statistics of data
center WEDOS and Nethost confirm that the impor-
tant thread lies in increasing intensity of DDoS attacks.
In 2013, these data centers detected attacks with in-
tensity around 3 Gbps, at the beginning of 2014, the
attacks had intensity of 6 Gbps and in the middle of
the year the attacks had intensity of 20 Gbps.
Generally, it is really difficult to defend against these
types of attacks because they do not target specific
vulnerabilities of the systems. Academia and industry
have made tremendous efforts to defend DDoS attacks
[10], [18]. In the first step, DDoS attacks are recogniz-
able and classifiable by detecting anomalies in network
traffic based on machine learning [19]. In the second
step, the illegitimate traffic is dropped. A simple ap-
proach is based on the black and white lists [20]. An
interesting method that tries to mitigate DDoS attacks
by an offensive approach was presented [21]. Tech-
niques based on packet marking require a huge amount
of packets to be monitored [22], [23]. In our research,
we focus on basic defense techniques that are based on
secure network infrastructure [24], [25], [26]. The most
important element of the infrastructure is IPS (Intru-
sion Prevention Systems).
On the market, several IPS solutions can be found
that detect and eliminate quite well the DDoS attacks
on the network infrastructure. The following list shows
the most known and used solutions: DDoS protection
(F5), DefencePro (Radware), DDoS protection (Pro-
lexic Technologies), Pravail Availability Protection Sys-
tem (ARBOR Networks) and ADS series (NSFOCUS
Information Technology). Commercially available so-
lutions contain several principal lacks that make impos-
sible their wide application. Main lacks can be sum-
marized as follows:
• High acquisition price - all commercial solutions
mentioned above are very expensive. The eco-
nomic cost is the main reason why most of the
smaller entities are unprotected (Valid for the
Czech Republic). From a simple calculation of the
number of DDoS attacks per year, the cost of the
IPS device, operating costs, the time when the de-
vice is active, it follows that it is an inefficiency
investment.
• Impossibility of the DDoS protection sharing -
for these systems, it is not possible to share the
DDoS protection for more entities, because pro-
ducers have know-how and they prevent sharing
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Fig. 1: Block diagram of the system proposed.
by license (in fact, these devices are not designed
for sharing).
• Problem of redundancy solution - it is not possi-
ble to realize redundancy without buying an addi-
tional equipment.
• Maximum throughput limitation - this is the crit-
ical disadvantage. These commercial devices are
limited by the maximum speed of the interface
(e.g. 10 Gbps) and the throughput cannot be in-
creased linearly (one can combine multiple devices,
but the price is multiplied). Based on the current
state, the average intensity of DDoS attacks ex-
ceeds the speed of 10 Gbps more than two times.
A modular DDoS protection system that would
allow to increase the filtering capacity linearly is
completely missing.
• Commercial solutions are not suitable for data
centers.
Recently, many companies such as Incapsula, De-
fense.net, Prolexic DDoS Mitigation Services, Verisign
DDoS Protection Services, CloudFlare Enterprise,
Nexusguard have offered DDoS protection as a service
based on the cloud. The cloud based DDoS protection
can be less expensive for certain types of the clients
(small/medium companies), nevertheless, the detection
and mitigation of DDoS attacks can take longer due
to the routing. Therefore, it is desirable to develop
DDoS solution with the following properties: cheap so-
lution, possibility to increase the filtering capacity lin-
early, suitability for data centers, scalable, and easy-
to-manage.
1.2. Our Contribution
This short paper reports some preliminary results and
the main ideas of our ongoing project. The main goal
of our project is to propose and implement a scalable
software DDoS protection that eliminates the lacks of
the commercially available solutions. Our research and
key observations are strongly focused on applicabil-
ity in data centers because the research is conducted
in cooperation with the commercial company Nethost.
The company operates data center with more than 800
servers and 2.500 VPS (Virtual Private Server). Our
main intention is to realize an anti-DDoS system where
it is possible to increase throughput (filtering capacity)
linearly and acquisition costs are really small. At the
beginning of the article, we have presented a critical
analysis of the existing IPS systems and our motiva-
tion. Based on the main facts, we propose our DDoS
solution that eliminates these lacks. We illustrate the
main ideas using the main functional components of
the system.
2. System Proposal
The key observation of system proposed is based on the
free availability of redundant hardware resources that
can be effectively used to eliminate (filter) DDoS at-
tacks. Data centers have to modernize their hardware
resources practically every year, therefore they have
plenty of reserve hardware that has a sufficient com-
puting power. For example, the company Nethost has
reserve hardware in the price of 260 000 $ at present.
The main idea is to develop a DDoS defense system
in the form of portable software image that can be
installed on the reserve hardware resources (servers).
During a DDoS attack, these servers will be used as
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Fig. 2: Block diagram of the DDoS filters implemented.
filters of this DDoS attack. The block diagram of the
system proposed is depicted in Fig. 1.
Reserve servers that contain the installed image of
the defense system, will be connected to the switch (or
bridge, it will be decided later based on benchmark test
realized during the project) using 1 Gbps or 10 Gbps
ports. By default, the defense system proposed (a filter
of DDoS) is turned off and it consumes no energy. Dur-
ing the DDoS attack, the required number of servers
will be connected using the power management system
and the required amount of traffic will be filtered using
the LACP (Link Aggregation Control Protocol). For
example, we connect two servers using 10 Gbps ports,
therefore the proposed system will be able to filter le-
gitimate traffic within the DDoS attack that exceeds
12 Gbps. After DDoS termination, the servers will be
turned off in order to save operating costs or special
software modules will be activated to accelerate proxy,
to perform security tests or to run a virus scan.
The defense system proposed includes filtering mod-
ules specialized that are targeted at the specific types
of DDoS attacks. This modularity allows easy and fast
modification, reaction and supplementation. The mod-
ular scheme also allows to eliminate the different com-
bination of DDoS attacks in a simple manner. We as-
sume that the system will always contain basic filters
such as SynFlood, UDPFlood, HTTPFlood and DNS-
Flood corresponding with the most commonly used
DDoS attacks. Furthermore, the system will contain
filtering modules extended for other types of DDoS at-
tacks (we assume ICMPFlood, FloodRST etc.) that
will be gradually implemented. Block diagram of the
individual filtering module is depicted in Fig. 2.
The entropy traffic models, time series analysis and
static analysis of data traffic are included in our re-
search to detect the DDoS attacks. We do not consider
the behavioral analysis methods because we intend
to avoid the problems associated with learning phase
(necessary learning, inaccuracy patterns, re-learning if
network configuration is changed, etc.). The individ-
ual filters are implemented in a form of special grids
that effectively eliminate specific DDoS attacks (grids
respond to specific protocol parameters or conditions
according to the protocols RFC (Request For Com-
ments)). In fact, this implementation represents an
improved state analysis of individual protocols.
The proposed modular system in the form of the
portable image is based on virtualization, therefore it
is possible to involve all available computing capacity
to filter DDoS attacks. Theoretically, one can filter any
amount of the traffic depending on the available com-
putational resources. The key advantage lies in the
linear increase of filtering capacity in response to the
current state of the DDoS attacks. This is the main ad-
vantage in comparison with commercial systems. The
scalable defense system reduces the costs by using own
hardware, i.e. the system represents a more convenient
solution in terms of investment and liquidity for a large
number of end users. We summarize the main advan-
tages of the system proposed in the following points:
• The system allows linear increasing of the filtering
capacity.
• The software solution is suitable for data cen-
ters (shared DDoS protection has influence on big
number of end users).
• The system is implemented on several individuals
nodes, therefore in case of failure, one will lose
only one part of the filtering capacity (redundant
solution).
• Effective usage of available hardware resources.
• Low price.
• Modularity enables quick reaction to new DDoS
attacks and to protect against combination of at-
tacks.
3. Conclusion
This paper reports some preliminary results and the
main ideas of our ongoing project, that aims to develop
a scalable DDoS mitigation system, which is suitable
for data centers. The main idea lies in utilization of
redundant hardware resources to eliminate the DDoS
attacks. We believe that the system proposed reaches
sufficient filtering capacity by combination of software
and hardware to meet the needs of data centers. The
main advantages of the system are the linear increasing
of the filtering capacity, sharing of DDoS protection
and low price.
Future work of our research is the implementation
and testing of the system proposed. Firstly, we want to
focus on benchmark testing of filtering capacity. Sub-
sequently, we will focus on the research and testing of
individual filtering modules.
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